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length of the delay would be only a matter of months or weeks, as in
tort actions, and an impending action threatened to consume the entire
estate.
Therefore, in the absence of any statutory provision or judicial
decision to the contrary, and in order to reach a fair and equitable
result in the majority of instances likely to arise, KRS 418.180(8)
should be interpreted to allow any action against the personal repre-
sentative of a person against whom an action has accrued prior to
death, which is commenced within one year after his qualification,
though such qualification does not occur until after the regular period
of limitation has expired.
The possibility that, on an extremely rare occasion, the conse-
quences of such an interpretation might be somewhat inconvenient is
not enough to justify an opposite conclusion.
John T. Bondurant
REVERSE EMINENT DOMAIN: A NEW LOOK AND
RE-DEFINITION
Introduction'
In Kentucky, the rule of sovereign immunity prevents recovery
against a sovereign arm when an injury occurs to a citizen or his
property while the sovereign is carrying on a "governmental function."
Some relief from this harsh rule is given by a doctrine called "reverse
eminent domain" which permits recovery in cases where the sovereign
may grant administration to a creditor, or to any other person, in its
discretion.
Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 895.050(1) (1956) provides:
If no executor is appointed by the will, or if all the executors die,
refuse the executorship or fail to give bond the court may grant
administration with will annexed to the person who would have been
entitled to administration if there had been no will....
These provisions allow a person who has a cause of action against the
decedent to take some affirmative steps to see that a personal representative of his
estate is appointed, where the heirs and/or devisees seem reluctant to do so. How-
ever, the relief they afford is at best incomplete, since it often depends to a great
extent on circumstances not within the control of the party entitled to sue and may
necessarily be invoked too late to secure qualification before the regular period of
limitation has elapsed. For a general discussion of the scope and applicability of
these statutes, see Adams v. Readover, 184 Ky. 280, 120 S.W. 279 (1909).
1 A very comprehensive series of three articles entitled "Claims Against the
State of Kentucky" by Paul Oberst and Thomas Lewis appear in 42 Ky. L.J. 65,
163, 334 (1953-54). General reference is made to the second article in that
series, 42 Ky. L.J. 163 (1953), in which the authors discuss the theory and
development of reverse eminent domain. That article is extremely thorough in its
treatment of the Kentucky cases on the problem of reverse eminent domain and is
an invaluable research aid on the subject.
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injures private property, provided the owner can bring his case within
sections 13 or 242 of the Kentucky Constitution. These sections limit
the power of a sovereign or its appointed agency to appropriate private
property to a public use by requiring the sovereign to pay for property
so appropriated.
The theory behind reverse eminent domain is that, if the Con-
stitution prohibits the taking of private property without compensation
and the sovereign does so anyhow, the sovereign by so acting must
have consented to a suit by the landowner.2 Under ordinary eminent
domain principles, the property is first condemned and payment made
before the property is used. Under reverse eminent domain, the use
of the property precedes the payment.
As said before, reverse eminent domain arises out of sections 13
and 242 of the Kentucky Constitution. Section 13 provides:
nor shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use
without the consent of his representatives, and without just compensa-
tion being previously paid to him. (Emphasis added)
It has been held that this is the only section that can be invoked
against the Commonwealth and its unincorporated agencies.3 Section
242 provides:
Municipal and other corporations, and individuals invested with the
privilege of taking private property for public use, shall make just
compensation for property taken, injured or destroyed by them; ...
(Emphasis added)
This section is held to apply to counties as well as to the enumerated
entities.4
In reading the cases, it is extremely difficult to get a clear under-
standing of the law on the subject of reverse eminent domain, es-
pecially in regard to such critical matters as:
1. What constitutes a "taking"?
2. What is meant by "property"?
3. What is meant by "public use"?
It should be npticed that both sections 18 and 242 require that
"property" be appropriated to "public use". However, the two sections
differ since the claimant must show a "taking" when he sues the Com-
monwealth or its unincorporated agencies under section 13, but need
only show an "injury" when he sues a lesser governmental arm under
section 242.
2 Layman v. Beeler, 113 Ky. 221, 67 S.W. 995 (1902).
3 Commonwealth v. Kelley, 814 Ky. 581, 236 S.W. 2d 695 (1951).
4 Layman v. Beeler, supra n. 2.
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Reverse Eminent Domain Critized
In the recent case of V.T.C. Lines Inc. v. City of Harlan,5 the court
indicated its dissatisfaction with the doctrine as it has been applied
in recent years. In that decision the court discussed two cases in
which injuries were inflicted by the State Highway Department upon
land lying adjacent to the highway. Both cases involved section 13
with its requirement of a "taking". In one case6 complaintant suffered
damages when dust was caused to settle upon his tobacco crop. In
that case, the court declined to grant relief upon reverse eminent do-
main principles. In the second case 7 there was a flooding of corn-
plaintant's land as the result of a faulty culvert. In that case plaintiff
recovered. The court in V.T.C. Lines remarked that the two decisions
were irreconcilable and Moremen, C. J., stated:
This indicates that we should either abandon ... governmental im-
munity or should cease to contrive artificial distinctions and decide the
cases by judicial fiat.8
This language serves to point up the difficulty involved in trying to
determine what the law is in regard to reverse eminent domain. It
further shows that the court feels that something should be done to
remedy the situation. It is submitted that a remedy lies in a judicial
re-definition of the doctrine.
What Is a Taking?
As said before, a claimant must show a "taking" under section 13,
while he need only show an "injury" under section 242. We must,
then, face the question of what is a "taking". Is it necessary to show
more than a mere "injury" such as a temporary trespass? Is any
"injury" a "taking" to the extent that damages have been inflicted
upon a recognized property right? Or, must there be something ap-
proaching a total ouster from possession?
The word "taking" has received varying constructions in different
courts. Some states construe the term in its strictest sense and com-
pensate only when private property is seized and the owner divested
313 S.W. 2d 573 (Ky. 1958).6 Commonwealth v. Moore, 267 S.W. 2d 531 (Ky. 1954).
7 Commonwealth v. Kelley, supra n. 3.8 V.T.C. Lines v. City of Harlan, 313 S.W. 2d 573, 577 (Ky. 1958). Another
instance in which the court expressed dissatisfaction with the doctrine as it is
presently applied is Curlin v. Ashby, 264 S.W. 2d 671 (Ky. 1954). In that case
the court said at 672,
Consideration of the cases, especially those based on negligence of the




of all right, title and interest.9 In these jurisdictions, there must be a
total ouster from the affected land by physical ejectment. Other states
adopt a less stringent construction of the word "taking" and recognize
a serious invasion of property rights as grounds for compensation. 10
Here, there is no requirement of a total ouster from possession, but the
ouster must be substantial and, usually, it must be permanent. Other
jurisdictions adopt a liberal construction of the term and allow com-
pensation to the owner for injuries to a recognized property right even
though there be no permanent physical ouster.1 Kentucky took this
view as early as 1878.12
Obviously, in those states which subscribe to the view that any
interference with a protected "property right" must be compensated,
no inquiry is necessary on the question of what is a "taking". The
emphasis is shifted to the question of whether there has been a de-
privation of a legally protected "property right". This is so even though
the word "taking" is used in a constitutional provision. The Kentucky
Court in recent years has emphasized that there must be a "taking"
before injuries inflicted by the Commonwealth or its agencies will be
compensated.13 However, the court has been quite consistent in
permitting recovery for mere temporary trespasses 14 and have allowed
compensation where there is no direct physical invasion of the adjacent
land, as where the "rights" of ingress and egress have been impaired.15
It would seem from these decisions that the distinction between an
"injury" under section 242 and a "taking" under section 13 is merely
illusory and makes no real difference in the final outcome of the suit.
It is submitted that no distinction should be made between the two
words and that any attempted distinction is unwarranted, as the
following inquiry into the genesis of the doctrine will reveal.
9 Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247 (1852).
10 Smith v. Erie R.R., 134 Ohio St. 135, 16 N.E. 2d 310 (1938).
"1United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); East Coast Lumber
Terminal, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 174 F. 2d 106 (2d Cir. 1949). This also
appears to be the view in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Wis-
consin, California and Utah.
2 Kemper v. City of Louisville, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 87 (1878).
13 Keck v. Halley, 237 S.W. 2d 527 (Ky. 1951); In Department of Highways
v. Corey, 247 S.W. 2d 389 (Ky. 1952), the court said at 390,
Unless the physical damage detailed in the testimony is of such a
nature as to amount to a 'taldng' . . . Mrs. Corey was not entitled
to a judgment....
The court made an award in this case involving the mere temporary flooding of
claimant's land.
14 Department of Highways v. Corey, supra n. 13; Keck v. Haley, supra n. 13;
Commonwealth v. Kelley, supra n. 3; Lehman v. Williams, 301 Ky. 729, 193 S.W.
2d 161 (1946).
15 Commonwealth v. Tate, 297 Ky. 826, 181 S.W. 2d 418 (1944).
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What Is "Property"?
Perhaps the most illuminating opinion to be found anywhere upon
the subject of what is property is Eaton v. B.C. & M. R.R.,16 decided in
New Hampshire in 1872. In Eaton the defendant, a railroad company
invested with the power of eminent domain, laid its road through
plaintiff's land and plaintiff was paid his damages. Later, the railroad
company, in constructing their road, cut through a ridge north of
plaintiff's farm. During the rainy seasons, waters occasionally came
through this opening from a river on the other side, causing quantities
of earth and stones to settle upon plaintiffs land. In deciding for
plaintiff, the court said:
The vital issue then is, whether the injuries complained of amount to
a taking of the plaintiff's property .... To constitute a 'taking of
property' it seems to have sometimes been necessary held that there
should be . . . 'a complete ouster. . . . These views seem to us to be
founded on a misconception of the meaning of the term 'property' as
used in the various State constitutions.
In a strict legal sense, land is not 'property,' but the subject of
property. The term 'property' although in common parlance frequently
applied to a tract of land or a chattel, in its legal signification 'means
only the rights of the owner in relation to it.' . . . 'Property is the
right of any person to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of a thing'. If
property in land consists in certain essential rights, and a physical
interference with the land substantially subverts one of those rights,
such interference 'takes,' pro tanto, the owner's 'property.'-12
In the above case, the court placed its decision upon the ground that
the plaintiff as owner of his farm had the "right" to have the protection
of the natural barrier left as it was, and that this right was a part of
the property in his land, and that the acts of the railroad company
amounted to a "taking" of this right and consequently a taking of his
property in the land.
The court in Eaton cited Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,18 a Supreme
Court case decided in 1871. In that case the Court, in criticising the
cases requiring a "total ouster" said:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing
a provision of constitutional law, always understood to have been
adopted for protection and security to the rights of the individual
as against the government, and which has received the commendation
of jurists, statesmen . . .it shall be held that if the government re-
frains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the
public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and
permanent injury to any extent . . .because, in the narrowest sense
of'that word, it is not taken for the public use. 19
1051 N.H. (3 Shirley) 504 (1872).
17 Id. at 511.
18 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
") Id. at 177, 178.
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To get the feelings of the Kentucky court during this time, it was felt
necessary to give these two quotations as general background. In the
first clear Kentucky case on the point, the Kentucky court, as did the
court in Eaton, cited Pumpelly as authority for holding that the flood-
ing of land by a sovereign arm was sufficient to constitute a taking of
property for which compensation must be made. That case is Kemper
v. City of Louisvill, 20 decided in 1878. True, the action was against
a municipality. However, the court was forced to construe what is
now section 13, so the question of what is a "taking of property" was
involved. Kemper, like Eaton and Pumpelly, involved a flooding of
plaintiffs land. In that case it was said:
While the citizen can claim no damages for the mere inconveniences
that may result from the construction or repairs of streets, where the
city so constructs an improvement as to interfere with the private
rights of the citizen, thereby causing an injury, the city must answer
in damages.21 (Emphasis added)
It should be noticed that no reference is made to the word "taking"
in this language of the court. The main consideration in reaching the
decision was whether or not one of the plaintiffs "private rights" had
been abridged. The court has now, apparently, lost sight of this
original and more easily applied test, and has shifted its emphasis to a
consideration of the word "taking". The fallacy of that test is that
nobody really knows what a "taking" is except as it relates to the
term "property". In a case arising out of section 13, the inquiry
should be, not what is a "taking", but what is a taking of "property".
If "property" is the sum of all the interests one holds in the land or
chattel, then the whole must be appropriated before there is a "taking".
But if "property" is any one or more of the sticks in a bundle of rights,
as the Eaton case so cogently says it is, then the word "taking" can just
as easily apply to an appropriation of such right or rights. In either
case, the word "taking" can be given its dictionary meaning, which
will eliminate any confusion on the point.
Intention of the Framers of the Present Section 13
The inquiry naturally arises as to the intention of the framers of the
1892 Kentucky Constitution as to the legal effect to attach to section
13. The present section is stated in the identical words of the cor-
responding section under the 1850 Constitution. Kemper v. City of
Louisville was a case arising under the previous section. Can it not be
presumed that the framers intended to assert their approval of the test
2 0 Supra n. 12.
21 Kemper v. City of Louisville, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 87, 91 (1878).
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laid down in that case, since they re-enacted the language without
change? Under usual tenets of constitutional construction, this seems
the only conclusion possible.22 Certainly, this possibility should be
reckoned with. At any rate, a re-definition of the doctrine is impera-
tive, as the cases will reveal. It is hoped that the above reference to
the history of the doctrine has proved efficacious in that regard.
Consequential Damages
In cases of reverse eminent domain, it is important to look to see
whether or not there has been a conveyance of a right-of-way prior to
the infliction of the damages. If there has, the damages might be
deemed to be consequential only, in the absence of a showing of
negligence or bad faith. The Kentucky court has said that the Com-
monwealth, in acquiring a right-of-way deed, also acquires the privi-
lege of inflicting certain types of damages if those damages are the
natural result of prudent road construction. An excellent example of
this is Commonwealth v. Moore.23 in which claimant had conveyed a
portion of his land to the Highway Department for road construction.
In the course of building the road, dust was caused to settle upon
claimant's tobacco crop, destroying it. The court, in deciding against
the claimant, said:
The right to cause dust in the proper construction or reconstruction of
a highway is one of the incidental rights the Commonwealth acquired
with the land purchase.... [Wlhen property is appropriated for pub-
lic use the compensation to which the landowner is entitled embraces
consequential damage to his remaining land, including covering it
with debris.2 4
The court held that the right to cover claimant's tobacco crop with
dust had already been purchased. It held that the right to impose
all the necessary and incidental inconveniences which result from
prudent road construction were purchased along with the right-of-way.
Similarly, the court has held that, in actions against counties under
section 242, no compensation would be allowed where there is a raising
of the level of the road, thus interfering with ingress and egress. 2
It has further been held that the removal of lateral support and the
22 Framers of a new Constitution who adopt provisions contained in a former
Constitution, to which a certain construction has been given, are presumed as a
general rule to have intended that these provisions should have the meaning
attributed to them under the earlier instrument. The embodiment in a Con-
stitution, without change of verbiage, of provisions found in previous Constitutions
precludes the court from giving their language a meaning different from that
ascribed to the previous constitutional provisions.... 11 Am. Jur. Constitutional
Law, sec. 67 (1937).23267 S.W. 2d 531 (Ky. 1954).
241d. at 532.25 Fallis v. Mercer County, 236 Ky. 315, 33 S.W. 2d 12 (1930).
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sliding of claimant's remaining land is an instance of consequential
damage.26 However, it is necessary that the activity which produces
the damage be restricted to the land which the governmental arm
has purchased under its right-of-way deed.
If the claimant can plead and prove negligence or bad faith, he
can recover in spite of the fact that the conveyance under the deed
would ordinarily work an estoppel.
Public Use
As to the question of what is the appropriation of property for a
"public use" the courts have been reluctant to commit themselves to
any set definition, feeling, probably, that any definition which the
courts might give may be inappropriate as times and conditions
change.27
In V.T.C. Lines, Inc. v. City of Harlan,28 the city was cleaning its
swimming pool by sandblasting, with the the result that emery dust
being used settled in great quantities on the bus station of plaintiff
and caused damage to working parts of diesel engines used in buses.
The court recognized that personal property as well as realty is sub-
ject to eminent domain. In the opinion of the court, it was said:
We believe that it is not an action where our rule of 'reverse eminent
domain' should apply. It falls more properly into the group of cases
which concern the responsibility of a city for its negligent act....
We further believe that the property destroyed was not of the type
which ordinarily may be devoted to public u.se.29 (Emphasis added)
In T. B. Jones & Co. v. Ferro Concrete Construction Co.,30 claimant,
a construction company, sued the City of Louisville to recover for
damage to its machinery which was covered by water by an inde-
pendent contractor who had contracted to lay a sewer for the city.
In denying recovery under reverse eminent domain, the court said:
[T]he provision [section 242] has reference to property taken under
the power of eminent domain; it has no reference to property which
was not taken and could not be taken under the power of eminent
domain. 31
This language is consistent with the holding in V.T.C. Lines insofar as
it states that this particular personalty, the machinery, was not subject
to the power of eminent domain and could not, under these circum-
stances, be appropriated to a "public use". Still, neither case lays down
26 Snyder v. Whitley County, 255 Ky. 741, 75 S.W. 2d 373 (1934).27 Jahr, Eminent Domain, 15 (1953).
28313 S.W. 2d 573 (Ky. 1958).
29 Id. at 579.
30 154 Ky. 47, 156 S.W. 1060 (1913).
31 Id. at 51. 156 S.W. 1062.
NoTEs
any test for guidance on the question of whether property, in a given
case, has been appropriated to a "public use".
In City of Covington v. Parsons3 2 the city, operating through an
independent contractor, dug a sewer line close to plaintiff's house. The
foundation of the house was weakened as a result of the excavation.
As to whether or not the property of plaintiff had been appropriated
to public use, the court said:
In the case at bar, the digging of the ditch was necessary and the very
thing the city contracted to have done, and the damages resulting to
appellee's property was the natural consequence of the removing of
the earth by excavating and digging the ditch, which was done in ac-
cordance with the plans and specifications of the city, and, the power
of eminent domain being involved, it is immaterial whether the con-
tractor did the work prudently or negligently. 33 (Emphasis added)
The inference is that the property will be deemed to have been ap-
propriated to a "public use" when the injury arises out of a project
necessary to be performed in the public interest, provided the injury
is the natural consequence of performing the project according to the
plans and specifications. It is submitted that this is the proper test. The
government should be presumed to have well considered the plans
and specifications under which the work was done and to have decided
upon the most efficacious way to do it. It should be presumed that
the government chose a reasonable way to accomplish the end and,
if the damage was the natural result of executing the work according
to those plans, then it must be presumed that the resulting damage
was a part of those plans. If it be decided that the injury was not the
natural result of the performance of the function according to the
plans, then the injury will probably be the result of: (1) A complete
abandonment of the plans, or (2) An injury to property which, by its
nature, could not be taken into account in the formulation of the plans.
Under the test laid down in City of Covington v. Parsons, the policy
underlying the eminent domain provisions will be given effect by
prohibiting the government from planning a public endeavor in such
a way as to secure a public advantage without paying for it. The rule
would have the following desirable effects:
1. It would result in more prudent planning on the part of the gov-
ernment.
2. It would eliminate the long line of "negligence" cases which are
now being criticized by the court.34
3. It would result in a test under which potential plaintiffs might
predict the outcome of litigation.
32258 Ky. 22, 79 S.W. 2d 353 (1935).
33 Id. at 28, 79 S.W. 2d 355, 356.
34 See n. 8.
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Application of the Rule: Illustrations
1. "B's" land is badly eroded because flood water was diverted
onto his land as the result of debris which collected around the sup-
ports of a state-maintained bridge.
Here, the bridge is a necessary public facility and it will be pre-
sumed the supports are situated where they have to be in order to
hold the bridge up. It will further be presumed that the injury is the
natural result of the collection of debris around the bridge support.
Still, the collection of the debris was not a part of the plans and
specifications, but resulted from an independant agency, the flood.
The defect is one that arises in course of time. If anything, the flood-
ing resulted from negligence on the part of the agent of the State in
failing to remove the debris as it accumulated.
2. In excavating for a road bed, employees of a contractor for the
State Highway Department use explosives, resulting in damage to
"B's" house from rocks cast upon his land. Use of explosives was
contemplated by the plans. All contractors of the State were instructed
to use hemp nets while blasting in order to prevent flying debris,
which instructions were not obeyed. The damage is attributable to
the State Highway Department since it was the natural result of the
execution of the work as planned. In such cases, minor departures
from the execution of the plans should not be considered as a com-
plete abandonment of the plans.
3. The State Highway Department plans and constructs a culvert
in such a way that water is forced upon "B's" land causing damage to
a movable chattel. Since the damage is fortuitous to the extent that it
results from the fact that movable personalty happens to be where
it is, the planning could not take its presence into consideration. Here
only an action under the Torts Claims Act for negligence could be
maintainable.
4. In excavating for a road bed, the Department of Highways, in
accordance with plans and specifications, removes dirt from a bank
below "B's" house. The digging is confinedto the Department's right-
of-way and no incroachment is made upon "B's" land. As a result of
the removal of the lateral support to "Bs" property, his house tumbles
into the road. The Department is liable. The damage is the natural
result of a necessary project which was performed according to the
plans and specifications.
(5) In reconstructing a road, the Highway Department plans
specify that the location of the road at a point fronting B's land
should be confined to the right-of-way previously acquired for that
purpose. Through the negligence of the employees of the State High-
[Vol. 47,
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way Department or its independant contractors, the road is made to
incroach upon the land of B. The State is liable since the case is one
which qualifies in any jurisdiction as an ACTUAL taking or occupation
of the land.
Conclusion
Reverse eminent domain, in its present ambiguous form, is a trap
for unwary litigants. Litigants may forego their rights under the Ken-
tucky Claims Act in order to secure the advantages which lie in
the doctrine of reverse eminent domain. Under that doctrine, the
award is limited only by the damages suffered while, under the
Claims Act, recovery is limited to $10,000. Also, under reverse eminent
domain, the liability of the government is absolute while the claimant
must show negligence if he proceeds under the Claims Act. However,
in choosing reverse eminent domain as the remedy to pursue, the liti-
gant is buying a "pig in a poke". A clarification of the doctrine is
essential and the following summary is a re-definition which it is
hoped states the true nature of the doctrine under the cases.
1. There is no distinction between a "taking" under section 13
and an "injury" under section 242. Consideration of the cases makes
this conclusion inevitable.
2. The real consideration is, and should be, what is "property"
under the two sections. Property is, and should be, any right which the
owner holds in relation to his land limited only by the fact that the
damage to the "property" might be of a consequential nature, due to
the fact of estoppel by prior conveyance.
3. The next consideration should be whether or not the property
was appropriated to a "public use." In this respect, the inquiry should
be whether or not the damage to the property is the natural con-
sequence of the execution of the plans under which the work was car-
ried on. Such a test would justify the decision in V.T.C. Lines and
would make it extremely difficult to ever recover under reverse eminent
domain for damages to movable personalty. Its recognition would
necessitate the overruling of the so-called "negligence" cases in which
the injury results solely from the tortious acts of the agents of the
Commonwealth.
Charles E. Goss
TRIAL JURY-THE POSSIBLE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES ON JURIES IN CRIMINAL CASES
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
guarantees trial by an impartial jury to an accused in a federal criminal
1959]
